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Introduction 
 
The issue of employment relations in the foreign operations of US-owned 
multinational corporations (MNCs) has attracted the attention of researchers for many 
years. The extensive literature has pointed to MNCs of American origin being more 
standardised, formalised and centralised in international policy making when 
compared with those of other nationalities (cf. Harzing 1999; Negandhi 1986; Young 
et al 1985; Yuen and Kee 1994). It has also indicated that US MNCs are particularly 
hostile to collective worker representation, and more likely to deploy HRM practices 
such as direct forms of employee involvement (cf. Dunning 1998; Enderwick 1985; 
for a review, see Edwards and Ferner 2002). 
 
Within the industrial relations field, however, many such studies have lacked a clear 
theoretical framework. One approach to understanding the nature of employment 
relations in the foreign operations of US firms has been to compare them with either a 
sample of local firms or groups of MNCs from other countries, and to attribute 
residual differences to the ‘American’ influence (e.g. Buckley and Enderwick 1985; 
Innes and Morris 1995). While this ‘residual approach’ may be useful in establishing 
the distinctiveness of the industrial relations policies of American MNCs, it does not 
offer a way of explaining their behaviour. A different approach can be termed 
‘culturalist’ in that the focus is primarily on the values and attitudes prevalent in the 
USA and the way that these shape the choices made by senior managers in 
determining employment practices. One variant of this approach is the use of 
Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions of national cultures (e.g. Ngo et al 1998; Bae et al 
1998). It is sometimes used in conjunction with the residual approach in that 
differences between groups of firms are ascribed to the influence of national cultures. 
However, this too does not provide an explanation for the home country influence 
since it simply begs a further question: why do particular sets of values and attitudes 
characterise a given country? 
 
An alternative to such explanations is to conceptualise a national economy as a 
‘national business system’, in which sets of interlocking structures and institutions in 
different spheres of economic activity combine to produce a nationally distinct way of 
organising economic activity (cf. Whitley 1992; 1999). The competencies of firms, as 
well as their economic behaviour, are thus seen as embedded within social, economic 
and political institutions at national level. In relation to MNCs, the business systems 
perspective leads to a focus on the ways in which institutions in the home country 
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inform the behaviour of firms at the international level, and the way this may be 
modified to fit the institutional context of various host countries. This approach 
appears to provide a more promising basis than the cultural approach for explaining 
the home and host country influences that shape a multinational’s approach to 
managing its workforce across borders, since it offers a way of understanding how 
prevalent values and attitudes become historically established, and potentially 
challenged over time. 
 
If firms are embedded in national business systems, such that their strategic choices, 
including those in employment relations, are shaped by societal institutions, then it 
follows that MNCs should be seen as having ties to multiple countries, not only the 
system of the country from which they originate, but also those of the host societies in 
which they operate. In order to understand the dynamic interplay of these business 
system effects, it is therefore necessary to compare the behaviour of MNCs across 
different host country environments.  
 
This paper is based on case study research into one large US MNC in the IT sector, 
code-named ‘ITco’. In order to gain the fullest possible understanding of the dynamic 
interplay of the various ‘embeddedness’ effects, and how these relate to the wider 
decision-making process in a firm faced with rapid market change, fieldwork was 
undertaken in four host countries in Europe (Germany, Ireland, Spain and the UK), as 
well as at corporate headquarters in the USA and the European regional headquarters 
(see below for methodological details). This research should be interpreted as in-depth 
investigation into a ‘critical case’, in that it is a globalising firm, operating in 
increasingly unstable product markets, which because of the nature of its business, 
currently requires substantial numbers of workers in each country in order to service 
national markets. In examining the process of the management of human resources in 
this firm, and practice in the areas of collective industrial relations and pay and 
performance management, we show how the institutional configurations of the 
American business system have influenced its management style in employment 
relations, as well as how this has been adapted to operate in the business systems of 
the various host countries examined. The case illustrates the importance of adopting a 
dynamic conception of national business systems, and of being attentive to the 
multiple levels at which institutional forces influence management style in 
employment relations. Moreover, the changing structure of the business and its human 
resource management function, and the negotiation of outcomes at both subsidiary 
and European levels, strongly indicates that employment relations outcomes are not 
simply outputs of macro-level systemic factors (or indeed competitive factors), but are 
continually negotiated within the firm. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The first section outlines the specific interpretation 
of macro-level institutionalism used as the research framework for the paper. The 
following section discusses methodological issues, highlighting the value of the single 
‘critical case’ approach adopted here, as well as specifying details of the empirical 
methodology. Some basic background data on the company is also provided. The 
findings of the research are divided into processual issues - taken here to mean the 
structure of the HR function, and the dynamic tension between centralisation and 
autonomy in the management of the firm – and the substantive issues of the 
management of collective industrial relations and pay and performance management. 
Finally, the discussion evaluates the relative weight and changing nature of embedded 
 3 
home and host country effects, within a context of the dynamic evolution of both 
home and host business systems, and links this macro-institutional approach with 
micro-level issues of control and authority. 
 
Approaches to the analysis of employment relations in MNCs 
 
This section outlines the institutionalist framework of analysis adopted in the paper. 
Before proceeding to this, however, it is worthwhile, given the continued 
predominance within the international HRM literature of ‘culturalist’ approaches, to 
explain why this paper does not follow this approach, and to outline our approach to 
culture. 
 
This approach does not deny the potential impact of culture, in its broad sense, on HR 
outcomes. The ‘cultural’ predispositions of actors, particularly relatively powerful 
ones such as senior managers, socialised in different societies, may well have a 
significant impact on the way that MNCs operate. However, culturalist approaches are 
generally limited in explanatory power in that they take ‘culture’ as a given, and 
assume it has an effect on the choices taken by actors. In our view, in order to get to 
the roots of national distinctiveness it is necessary to assess where such ‘cultural’ 
predispositions emerge from, and to analyse, rather than assume, their impacts within 
the management of the MNC.  
 
In fact, culture can be analysed within an institutionalist analysis. From an American 
neo-institutionalist perspective, for example, the cognitive and normative pillars of 
institutions (Di Maggio and Powell 1982) – referring, respectively, to widely shared 
social knowledge, and to the beliefs, assumptions and values held by the population – 
basically reflect the concept of ‘culture’ in different terms (for an application to 
MNCs, see Kostova and Roth 2002). 
 
National business culture does not emerge from a simple aggregation of the individual 
preferences of the relevant population (Hofstede 1980) detached from the national 
institutional form of capitalism. Rather, individuals are embedded in a national 
societal system that shapes the nature of ‘norms’ in the employment relationship, and 
hence what are appropriate means of management. Given the power asymmetry 
within the employment relationship, the normative and cognitive understandings 
developed by employers and their managerial agents are likely to be significantly 
stronger influences on broad societal understandings of appropriateness than those of 
individual employees. Hence, national management culture is in itself shaped by the 
political economy of the relevant society.  
 
A further complication is that culture does not merely exist at the national level. Of 
particular relevance here is the proposition that the cultural predispositions of MNC 
employees, and above all managers, are likely to be shaped by the MNC itself. While 
we may question the assumptions of organisational ‘culture purists’, who assume that 
values can be transmitted down the organisational hierarchy in a relatively 
straightforward manner (cf. for example, Deal and Kennedy 1982; Schein 1985; 
Hofstede 1991; see Collins 2000 for a critique), it must be acknowledged that firms 
generally, and perhaps MNCs particularly, do not govern their operations by a ‘web 
of rules’ alone, but also by the construction of a set of normative understandings as to 
what is appropriate or desirable behaviour. Not all individuals, even at senior 
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management level, will buy into the thinking behind such corporate-level ideological 
constructions. Nevertheless, these constructions do act, in effect, as institutions, in 
that they cognitively and normatively shape the choices genuinely available to actors 
within the organisation. 
 
In summary, the approach taken here does not deny the influence of culture. Our 
argument is that the preferences of key actors are shaped by cognitive and normative 
understandings emanating from distinct sets of institutions that condition the 
employment relationship. Consequently, when examining the choices available to 
MNCs in diverse societies, institutionalist approaches are likely to be of more utility 
than approaches that are limited to charting individual preferences without identifying 
their sources or their likely effect in shaping the scope of strategic choice. 
 
Institutionalist approaches 
 
In its simplest form, an institutionalist approach could focus on home and host 
country institutions and see the nature of employment relations within the foreign 
subsidiaries of MNCs as the result of calculation about how to balance these sets of 
influences. However, there are a number of factors that make the calculation of likely 
outcomes considerably more complex than a simple trade off between these two sets 
of factors. Edwards and Ferner (2002), for example, identify four influences on MNC 
behaviour, namely country of origin effects, dominance effects, pressures for 
international integration, and host country effects. 
 
Country of origin effects refer to elements of the behaviour of MNCs which can be 
traced back to the characteristics of the national business system (NBS) from which 
the MNC originates; in other words, the interlocking relationships between societally 
constructed institutional forms in areas such as industrial relations, training and 
education, the welfare state, the nature of inter-firm and intra-firm coordination within 
the economy, the firm-level division of labour and of management roles, and the 
nature of corporate finance (Maurice et al 1986; Whitley 1992; 1999; Esping 
Andersen; Hall and Soskice 2001; Rubery 1994). There is controversy as to the extent 
to which such effects remain prevalent within globalising MNCs (for opposing views, 
see Hu 1992; Ohmae 1993). One strand of the literature claims that such 
‘transnational’ corporations are no longer best viewed as hierarchies, with the home 
country headquarters at the apex and foreign operations as subordinate, but as 
networks of related affiliates (Nohria and Ghoshal 1997) or “heterarchies” (Hedlund), 
where managerial decision making is dispersed rather than concentrated, lateral 
linkages between subsidiaries are significant, and control is primarily exercised 
through normative integration (cf. Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995: 737). 
 
Yet while many MNCs may operate internally as network organisations in the sense 
that decentralised networks connect among specific projects, creating patterns of 
shifting alliances and partnerships, based on the sharing of information (cf. Castells 
2000: 11), very few fit Castell’s stricter condition that “(B)y definition, a network has 
no centre” (ibid: 15), with dominance within the organisation shifting between groups 
according to their relative efficiency in absorbing and processing information. There 
are strong reasons why this situation is unlikely. Firstly, even the most globalised of 
MNCs are “national firms with international operations” (Hu 1992) in that they 
operate subsidiaries under a principal-agent relationship, with monitoring essential to 
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achieve the goals of the corporation and satisfy the providers of capital. Significantly, 
the latter remain predominantly based in the country of origin (Doremus et al 1998) 
and control tends to be exerted by nationals of the home country; for example Ruigrok 
and van Tulder (1995) found that 25 of the 30 largest US MNCs had no foreign 
nationals on the board of directors. Moreover, it has been argued that the globalised 
nature of MNCs has been exaggerated, with activities, particularly strategic functions 
such as R&D, being disproportionately concentrated in the country of origin (Hirst 
and Thompson 1999; Pauly and Reich, 199?).  
 
Turning to the specific nature of US country of origin effects on employment 
relations, research has repeatedly shown that US-owned MNCs are more likely than 
those from other countries to have relatively centralised and formalised systems of 
human resource and industrial relations management (cf. Ferner et al 2004). 
Effectively, US MNCs have tended to export the organisational forms and 
management methods that were established in the USA to serve continental-wide 
markets. They have thus introduced to other countries the multidivisional 
organisational form, with its division of management functions into distinct and 
highly specialised areas such as production, finance and personnel (Dunning 1998). 
Equally, the relative reluctance of US MNCs abroad to engage with systems of 
collective employee representation can be traced back to the particularly hostile 
relationship between capital and organised labour in the USA, as well as a more 
general opposition to state regulation of the employment relationship, both of which 
have strong socio-historical roots (cf. Jacoby 1997). It has also been argued that the 
strong market-based norms behind the employment relationship in the USA have led 
to US firms being keen to export systems of performance appraisal and performance-
related pay (Muller 1999), and that the effects of the civil rights movement and anti-
discrimination legislation in the USA have led US MNCs to adopt relatively strong 
formal policies on ‘diversity’, which are often exported overseas, such that the 
managers of foreign subsidiaries are assessed against diversity targets (Ferner 2003: 
93). 
 
The concept of dominance effects refers to the idea that dominant or hegemonic states 
are able to exert organisational, political and technological influences that invite 
dissemination and adoption around the global capitalist system. For instance, there is 
substantial evidence that in the post-war era, there were widespread state-sponsored 
and voluntary initiatives within subsidiaries of US MNCs to diffuse American 
managerial and production techniques in Western Europe (Dunning 1998; for further 
discussion see Clark 19xx on “governance”; Djelic 19xx on “exporting”; Carew 
1987). At the level of the firm, dominance effects create an incentive on the part of 
actors in firms in countries that are not dominant to emulate the practices that they 
perceive to contribute to the success of firms in dominant countries. Conversely, firms 
that originate in dominant countries have an incentive to take advantage of what they 
see as the factors that give rise to the economic strength of the country of origin by 
‘exporting’ key practices to their foreign subsidiaries. 
 
Dominance effects are implicitly reflected in the international HRM literature via 
reference to both ‘ethnocentric’ and ‘geocentric’ (Perlmutter, 1969) approaches to 
international HRM. In the case of the former, the extensive literature concerned with 
the IR and HR practices in the foreign subsidiaries of American and Japanese MNCs 
was governed by the notion that we might expect both groups of firms to transfer 
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many aspects of the home country system since they have acted as representatives of 
‘dominant’ economic systems. In relation to the latter, a smaller body of work 
examines the implications of geocentric mindsets driving global integration through 
the diffusion and standardisation of HR practices that are not necessarily parent-
driven. One strand of this work has considered the notion of ‘reverse diffusion’ in 
which practices originating in the foreign subsidiaries are incorporated into global HR 
policies (e.g. Edwards and Ferner, 2004).  
 
International management specialists have made much of increased pressures for 
international integration within MNCs (Prahalad and Doz 1987; Ghoshal and Bartlett 
1998; Adler and Ghadar 1990). This may be attributed to reduced cross-national 
differences in consumer tastes, the deregulation of product markets and the reduction 
of tariff barriers, making it more feasible for MNCs to achieve synergies between 
their subsidiaries (Edwards and Ferner 2002). Much of this literature posits that 
pressures for international integration of operations, and consequently of HR, are 
likely to be high where: other MNCs represent a large proportion of the customer 
base, leading to coordination of pricing, service and support worldwide; global 
competition is prevalent; firms have high fixed costs in R&D; production is capital 
and technologically intensive; under cost reduction strategies; and where there is a 
universal product (Prahalad and Doz 1987). Hence, the extent of these pressures will 
vary by sector and product market. 
 
In addition to global integration, many MNCs face the pressure of presenting a unified 
face to regionally integrated markets, and consequently seek to achieve a degree of 
international integration within regions. Since these pressures are particularly strong 
within the European Union – given the freedom from formal barriers to trade, the 
harmonisation of competition rules, and some, albeit limited, supra-national 
development of industrial and social policy (cf. Marginson 2000) - we might expect 
the European HQ of a globalising US MNC to have assumed a greater degree of 
influence over employment relations, thus complicating the relationship between 
home and host countries. 
  
Finally, host business systems vary in terms of how ‘open’ they are, making them 
more or less amenable to external management styles (cf. Whitley 2001). In other 
words, the scope for home country based ‘innovation’, taken here to mean practices 
that are unfamiliar in the host context, may be related to the degree and embeddedness 
of national regulation, such that ‘innovation’ in this sense may be easier in less 
actively regulated business and employment systems. However, as is increasingly 
recognised among American industrial relations academics investigating the ‘high 
performance’ paradigm, institutions may be resources as well as constraints, meaning 
that high value-added resources may well be located in high-skilled and highly-
regulated economies. Host country effects do not only capture, as is sometimes 
implicitly assumed, the constraining influences of legislation or of national collective 
bargaining and representation structures, but also incorporate the societally-informed 
rationality of host country managers, as reflected in our earlier discussion on culture 
(see also Broad 1994, Wächter and Müller-Camen 2001). 
 
The strength of host country effects does not only depend on the cohesiveness of its 
institutions. The degree to which national economies are dependent on foreign MNCs 
varies considerably from country to country, even within the EU. Where this level of 
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dependence is high, one might expect foreign MNCs to have a substantial collective 
impact on the nature of the business system, as is the case, for example, in Ireland 
(Gunnigle et al 2003). Moreover, the impact of host country effects on a given MNC 
will depend on its degree of ‘locational flexibility’. Where the MNC can produce 
credible threats of re-location to more lightly-regulated or lower cost countries, or 
simply choose to operate in business systems which are of a similar nature to that of 
the home country, the impact of host country effects may be reduced. This degree of 
locational flexibility varies by product market, and wholesale relocation is much more 
difficult to achieve in the service sector generally, although as the case material will 
show, there is substantial and increasing room for manoeuvre at the margin. 
 
Towards a dynamic, multi-level institutionalist analysis 
 
The section above gives considerable emphasis to the notion that economic actors, 
and hence the HR and general business strategic decisions of firms are strongly 
embedded in national business systems (cf. Whitley 1992; 1999). Research starting 
from such premises has often been criticised for its inability to deal adequately with 
changes to national business systems themselves (Michon 1992; Almond and Rubery 
2000). It is necessary, therefore, to recognise that national level institutions, and the 
national business systems of which they are a component part, alter over time, with 
powerful actors within the system contesting the nature of the system in order to 
pursue their own goals. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse how national 
business systems evolve. For the micro-level analysis here, however, it is necessary to 
be aware that national business systems do change, altering the rationality of actors 
within them. Indeed, one reason for undertaking micro-level qualitative research is to 
help establish to what extent apparent changes to national business systems, such as 
the widely documented  development of the ‘shareholder value’ model of corporate 
finance in the USA, have on the rationality of actors and on choices made.  
 
Equally, macro-institutionalist approaches risk attaching too much emphasis to extra-
firm institutions, and too little to organisational politics at different levels within the 
firm. Hence, while the institutional configurations within which the wider firm is 
embedded are likely to structure the nature of employment relations across different 
units, actors at all levels of the organisation will always retain at least some scope to 
pursue aims and goals of their own. Even where actors at corporate level issue explicit 
guidelines or edicts, these may sometimes be circumvented. Lower level actors may 
also possess resources which afford them some power in their relationships with 
higher levels of management; the power to interpret the ‘host country effect’ is one of 
these. There is, of course, a wealth of evidence from the organisational sociology 
literature on the space that actors possess within institutional constraints. For 
example, in a classic study of the nature of bureaucracy in two French public sector 
organisations, Crozier (1964: 189) argues that even those actors in low positions 
within a hierarchy operate with a degree of autonomy: 
 
There is always some possibility of play within the framework delimited by the rules, and 
therefore dependence relations and bargaining are never completely suppressed. … (R)ules 
cannot take care of everything and management must rely on workers support and must 
therefore bargain for it.  
 
Such processes of the negotiation of order are naturally rendered all the more complex 
in multi-layered international firms. In the case of outcomes within the foreign 
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subsidiaries of MNCs, they cannot simply be read off from a broad understanding of 
host country business systems, but are the result of various actors, with different 
power resources, negotiating what the nature of such host country effects actually are. 
 
Hence, the approach taken in the current research seeks to identify country of origin, 
dominance, integration and host country effects within one highly complex MNC, but 
avoids simply reading these off from a consideration of structural or institutional 
factors. We emphasise that each group of potential effects varies across time and 
space, both in response to external economic and macro-institutional change, and to 
the sub-micro strategies adopted by actors at various levels of the organisation. We 
also stress the inter-related nature of the four influences in the framework. For 
example, in small economies that are the recipients of considerable amounts of FDI 
from one particular country, as is the case with Ireland and American FDI, the country 
of origin effects may have influenced the host business system to such an extent that 
they have become subsumed into host country effects. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The data analysed in the paper are drawn from a three-year case-study of a large US-
based multinational in the IT sector (referred to as ITco), which has formed part of a 
broader programme of research into the HRM policies and practices of US MNCs 
within the EU. The key issue underpinning the research concerns the dynamics of the 
relationship between home country, host countries and globalising pressures in order 
to investigate whether MNCs with US origins can be said to be peculiarly ‘American’ 
in this respect. This research programme has involved collaboration between teams of 
researchers in the UK, Germany, Spain and Ireland, with the four teams working to 
common objectives and studying the same firms as far as possible.   
 
The firm’s markets have changed considerably in recent years. Whereas some years 
ago the IT industry was dominated by hardware suppliers, the sector is now seen as 
broken up into sub-sectors, with most firms striving to find a niche in which they have 
a degree of monopolistic power. For instance, the manufacturing of micro-chips is 
dominated by Intel and the development of operating system software by Microsoft. 
Our case study company has a number of business divisions, including the 
manufacturing of a range of products, but the fastest growing division is IT services in 
which the firm maintains and upgrades the IT systems of other firms on a 
subcontracted basis. 
 
The concentration on a single case study can be criticised. For instance, it can be 
argued that case studies are difficult to replicate and do not allow empirical 
generalisations to be made. However, such criticism can be countered by arguing that 
case studies allow analytical connections between social processes. This method can 
uncover patterns and practices that were previously undocumented but subsequently 
turn out to be widespread. Perhaps most fundamentally, single case studies can be 
‘critical cases’ in that they provide particularly interesting conditions in which to 
explore a phenomenon (Edwards et al,. 1994: 9). For example, if a phenomenon is not 
found in ‘its most likely setting’ then it is unlikely to be found in other less conducive 
settings (e.g. Belanger et al., 1999) . A further crucial advantage of a single case study 
is that it allows resources to be concentrated in a particular firm, thereby extending 
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the depth of the analysis and facilitating a greater range of concrete examples to be 
elaborated upon. 
 
The background to ITco makes it a particularly interesting one in which to investigate 
the issues at the heart of this paper. In the US, ITco is a classic ‘welfare capitalist’ 
firm (Jacoby, 1997): there has been a distinctive and lasting influence from the 
founding family; historically, a strong internal labour market was linked to very high 
job security and very low turnover; pay is still seen as relatively good and the 
company pioneered a range of fringe benefits, such as sickness and holiday pay; and 
management exhibits an ideological antipathy to unions. While this welfare capitalist 
approach has been challenged in recent years by the internationalisation of product 
markets and the evolution of the financial markets, its heritage remains evident. 
Crucially, implementing such a management style internationally is likely to be 
considerably more difficult in the more regulated economies studied than in the UK 
and Ireland. Since the company has significant operations in every country in Europe, 
it is not the case that it has simply avoided those national systems which present 
particular institutional barriers to its preferred way of managing labour. The company 
can, therefore, be seen as a ‘critical case’ of exploring home country effects in quite 
different host country environments. 
 
The host countries are interesting for the variety of labour market institutions 
they exhibit. Germany is the most highly regulated of the four, with the 
complementary role of unions and works councils clearly codified. This not only 
constrains a multinational’s approach to employee representation but also requires 
companies to negotiate the introduction of practices in a range of areas. Spain also has 
regulations concerning employee representation at firm level, but representative 
bodies tend to be weaker than in Germany both in terms of their formal powers and 
their influence in practice. The Spanish labour market more generally has undergone a 
phase of deregulation in recent years, particularly affecting the ease with which firms 
can lay off workers. The UK and Ireland are much more deregulated than the other 
two countries, with much weaker structures of employee representation, and therefore 
provide interesting contrasts. They are also major bases for US MNCs in Europe. The 
UK is the recipient of around a quarter of US FDI into Europe, while it is estimated 
that FDI stock from U.S. firms amounts to $3,000 per head of population in Ireland, 
as compared to  $2,000 in Britain, $500 in Germany and France, and $200 in Spain 
(cf. the Economist 1997, OECD, 2000).  
 
The research design allowed the national research teams to choose to examine the part 
of the company which has most significance within their country. For instance, in 
Ireland, manufacturing is by some way the biggest division in terms of employment 
and this is where fieldwork was conducted. In the UK, by contrast, the IT services 
division has grown markedly in recent years, so it was this division that was the focus 
of the study. While this approach does not enable us to compare identical operations 
across countries, it has the advantage that it enables us to examine issues of great 
significance in each country, and to relate these to features of the national business 
system in question. Moreover, given that ITco’s operations are highly stratified across 
countries in that the nature of the activities performed varies from country to country, 
comparing identical operations would be extremely difficult, sometimes impossible. 
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The particular focus of the fieldwork was on both processual and substantive issues. 
In relation to the former, the research considered the extent to which the international 
HR policies of ITco were embedded in the US business system, and the relative 
influence of, and relations between, corporate, European, divisional and national 
levels of management within the firm. There were two principal substantive issues: 
pay and performance management, and employee representation. We might expect the 
strength of local ‘isomorphic’ pressures – that is, the need for MNCs to adapt their 
practices so that they operate effectively in different countries – to vary across these 
two issues. Specifically, pay and performance management systems, particularly for 
managerial and professional staff, are likely to be less subject to local isomorphic 
pressures than the nature of employee representation. Moreover, both of these issues 
are key elements of the ‘welfare capitalist’ model that ITco typifies and are, therefore, 
issues over which we might expect the HQ to exert a significant degree of influence. 
 
The paper draws on data from six countries in total. Fieldwork has taken place at the  
corporate HQ in the USA, at the European HQ and in each of the four main countries 
in which the research teams are based. We also draw on data from France – a country 
where a strong tradition of state regulation of the workplace presents significant 
constraints on management, at least in the areas of restructuring and formal collective 
representation – though the extent and depth of these data are not comparable to the 
four principal countries. For understandable practical reasons, most studies of MNCs 
have been focused in either the home country or in one particular host country. The 
former type of case study is not well placed to judge how international policies are 
implemented in practice; the latter, on the other hand, does not enable an evaluation to 
be made of how much of what is observed is specific to that particular country. Our 
focus on multiple levels and countries gets round these problems. 
 
The primary method of gathering data has been the in-depth interview. Interviewing 
followed a common template across the various countries such as the locus and 
mechanisms of HR decision making, the organisation of the HR function locally and 
cross-nationally (including its link with business planning systems), and the detail of 
practices in the two substantive areas of employment practice identified above. This 
common approach did not prevent interviewers using their discretion in adding 
questions appropriate to the particular national context or to the particular type and 
level of respondent concerned. In total, the case study comprised 55?check? 
interviews. 
 
The amount of data collected varied between countries. Nevertheless, the 
comparability of the data across these countries stems from the core interviews with 
senior HR staff in all of the four main countries. These were the interviews for which 
close collaboration between the research teams took place. In addition to these 
interviews, the national teams conducted additional research which varied according 
to access, resources and the extent of publicly information. Overall, the study of ITco 
provides extensive data with which to draw a cross-national comparison of a ‘critical 
case’ across quite different national systems. While it is of course only one company, 
and the extent of our data varied across countries, we are well positioned to try and 
‘unravel home and host country effects’.  
 
Key findings 
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The findings from the case study are presented in two principal sections. The first 
examines the nature of central influence over the European subsidiaries through a 
consideration of the complex business structures in place and how these have changed 
over time. The second assesses the evidence relating to whether this is a distinctive 
embedded American influence over collective employment relations and the 
management of pay and performance. 
 
HR Processes and Structure 
 
One striking aspect of the coordination of HR policy across countries in ITco is the 
way in which the extent of central influence has shifted over time. Until the 1980s the 
company was characterised by a number of global policies issued by the corporate 
HQ which national managers were expected to implement. Some limited room was 
afforded for these to be adapted to the demands of the various national systems in 
which the firm operated, and country HR and other senior national managers were 
accountable to those at corporate level to this effect. During the late 1980s the firm 
moved away from this highly centralised approach, allowing more influence to 
national level management to develop policies that suited their local circumstances. 
However, this tendency was reversed in the early 1990s, and there has followed a 
period during which strong coordination of HR policies between countries has been 
re-established. This takes place within a matrix structure consisting of geographical 
regions (North America, Europe/Middle East/Africa, Asia Pacific, etc) and the 
product-based business units. 
 
This re-establishment of strong central control has run alongside a change in the 
operating principles of the subsidiary HR function. ITco has moved from a classic 
MNC structure with national HR managers responsible for affairs in their subsidiary, 
to a regional European structure, with responsibilities divided into functions 
(compensation, recruitment, etc.) reporting to a European head. Hence, the region has 
become the predominant level in most areas of HR policy, with the exception being 
the employee relations function, which was kept at the national level given the 
inevitability of relations with collective labour in most continental European 
countries. The European HR Director is now seen by most of our respondents as 
having a much more influential role in policy development than hitherto. Alongside 
this, there has been a marked reduction in HR staff at national levels, particularly due 
to the introduction of a phone-based service centre operating from the UK, fielding 
basic HR-related enquiries from across Europe. Staff numbers in the Spanish HR 
function, for example, fell by 50 per cent immediately following the introduction of 
the service centre. It was also evident that national HR directors no longer have the 
influential positions they once did, though there was some variation in this respect; 
compared with their UK counterpart, the German and French HR Directors continued 
to play key roles in operating the complex and highly regulated systems of 
representation and bargaining in place in these two countries. 
 
At divisional level, meanwhile, HR specialists have been re-labelled “Business 
Partners”, acting as internal consultants who operate in conjunction with  line 
managers in one of the divisions, often with responsibility for a number of countries 
within that division. Consequently, it is difficult to characterise this group as being 
part of a national HR function. 
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Our interviews confirmed that corporate HQ had a strong preference for uniformity 
globally. One quote, from an Irish employee relations specialist, summarises a fairly 
common feeling across subsidiary managers; “The US would like everyone to do 
everything the same across the world. I think that’s an American thing, not just an 
ITco thing”. The Spanish respondents also felt that regionalisation was a new form of 
centralisation: “By now real power is in (European HQ). The local Country Manager 
works to assure that local efforts are in line to achieve the corporate and business 
divisions’ strategies” (Finance Director, Spain). The centralising tendency in HR 
policy is perhaps best summarised by the Spanish HR Director. 
 
In HR still we have three diverse types of practices, the identical ones, the similar ones and the 
different ones; however the homogenisation tendency is very clear. We still have the three 
kinds of practice because we come from the opposite side (polycentric approach) and the 
inertia and local customs have an important influence. Those identical practices are the ones 
without any legal implications in Spain...It’s just a matter of time before we’ll only have 
identical and similar HR policies and practices 
 
However, subsidiary managers do see some advantages to dealing with a European, 
rather than corporate, headquarters due to the greater level of appreciation of 
managers at the former level of intra-regional differences, allowing for greater 
flexibility, “because within Europe everything is so different, employment law, 
contracts (of employment). They (regional HQ) are a lot more used to having to flex 
things in (Europe). Yes they will have to justify to the States, but they understand 
easier” (employee relations specialist, Ireland). 
 
There is also some evidence that national subsidiaries retain the capacity to develop 
strategies which are to some degree autonomous of corporate approaches. This can 
occur in the area of HR policy itself. For instance, within the German employment 
system, initial vocational training is of paramount importance. As budgets have 
become more important than headcounts in HR planning, the German subsidiary has 
to justify this investment in terms of profitability and expenses. One way to do this is 
to sell it as a local way to achieve the corporation’s aim to build a highly qualified 
workforce; “we have to discuss very intensively every year within the scope of 
planning the vocational training, how to implement quantity and quality and how to 
defend the investment in the corporation” (German HR manager). More broadly, 
national subsidiary managers are aware of the possibility of re-location of some 
facilities, and attempt to develop country-specific strategies to defend and develop 
corporate investment in their host countries, often related to competitive advantage in 
terms of HR. For example, much of the employment growth in ITco and other US 
MNCs in Ireland has mainly been in the manufacturing area, the country being 
initially attractive as a location for FDI as having a relatively lightly regulated 
employment system, a favourable fiscal system, and low labour costs compared to its 
EU competitors. Recent economic growth in Ireland, wage inflation and labour 
shortages, and the expansion of the EU endangers this position. Irish management is 
attempting to address this problem: 
 
We are at the moment close to 60 percent manufacturing dependent. Our strategy is to get that 
down to maybe 30 percent over three or four years on the basis that the jobs they are doing 
now will not be sustainable or competitive in this environment. We have to find ways of 
moving up the food chain (Country Manager, Ireland) 
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Despite the oscillation of central influence over time, the growing influence of regions 
and divisions, and the moves by national level managers to retain an influential role 
within the company qualify the picture of central control in ITco, a distinctive 
influence from the corporate HQ on employment relations was still evident in the 
company, something that shows up in a number of respects. For example, while the 
precise design and operation of the service centre was left to regional managers, the 
model was based on an earlier innovation in the US. Moreover, the region was 
expected to work within the constraints of global policies in most areas, particularly 
performance management, while many regional HR managers worked closely with 
their corporate counterparts, particularly on issues that had clear international 
elements such as the management of international assignments. The influence of 
corporate HQ also shows up in the operation of policies in the two substantive areas 
of HR/IR considered in this paper. 
 
Industrial Relations 
 
The impact of the home country shows up very clearly in the area of employee 
representation. The welfare capitalist, American roots of the firm in Europe are 
evident through a strong preference for avoiding unions wherever possible. While this 
does not take the form of a central policy, the parent company’s wishes are 
communicated unambiguously to managers in all of the countries we examined. 
 
One historical example of the strength of feeling on this issue can be found in the UK 
subsidiary. During the 1970s, unions were pushing to recruit members and succeeded 
in using the quasi-statutory union recognition procedure that was in place at the time 
to force the issue. British managers campaigned hard against recognition, stressing the 
paternalistic side of the company; one of those involved in the managerial campaign 
reported that managers had told the workforce that “you’re joining ITco, ITco look 
after you from cradle to grave”. Another tactic was to stress that the existing company 
council did the job of representation effectively and there was no need for an ‘outside’ 
influence. These tactics worked, and workers voted by a large majority against union 
recognition. A senior manager who had been involved in the company’s campaign 
described the “halo effect” that they had enjoyed for some time following this victory 
in the eyes of corporate HQ: 
 
So we were heroes to the States. Here was this system, this great system that was the creation 
of (the founding family), this was the system being tested. So we had letters of congratulation, 
“wonderful achievement”, “shows the system works”. It was a vindication that had never been 
attained before, because there had been no vote on the ITco system (retired UK HR Director) 
 
Hence, the corporate industrial relations philosophy of ITco is clear. That this remains 
the case was underlined by our respondents. The following quotation from an HR 
Business Partner in Ireland, on dealing with grievances, is typical. 
 
It has happened (that a group of employees have come to discuss an issue collectively). We 
would diffuse the situation and deal with each one (of the employees) one-by-one, each person 
one-by-one. That’s typical ITco practice. We don’t deal with collectives. 
 
The historic means of retaining non-union status, or of restricting collective influence 
in more institutionalised systems, remain to some extent present. Paying above market 
rates, open door policies and a good working environment were mentioned by a 
variety of respondents, and seen, particularly by Irish respondents, as being in place 
 14 
specifically to forestall attempts at union organisation. However, the picture is 
necessarily more complex than this. Most fundamentally, there are industrial relations 
systems in which simple union avoidance is not an option. Moreover, some of the 
basic tenets of sophisticated paternalism are hard to operate in changed circumstances, 
given a combination of more competitive product markets and increased shareholder 
pressures for short-term results. 
 
A good illustration of these pressures is ITco’s response to the German industrial 
relations system. Until the early 1990s, ITco was covered by the sectoral collective 
agreement of the metal industry. However, as the company was restructured in the 
early 1990s, new business units were formed for the growing service sector elements 
of the firm’s business. In Germany, these business units were legally independent, and 
did not join the employers’ association, although managers deny that the avoidance 
was a motive for the legal split. Works councilors forced management to negotiate a 
company-level agreement, although this was with a more moderate trade union based 
in the service sector. This agreement, which now covers the majority of ITco’s 
German workforce, is unlike the company-based agreements in some larger German 
firms such as Volkswagen (Jurgens, 2002), in that it only specifies minimum rather 
than actual terms and conditions. The implication of this is that each formally 
independent business unit can negotiate its own terms and conditions with its works 
council. The most important substantive aspect of the company agreement was a 
general increase in the working week from 36 to 38 hours, with significant flexibility 
to impose longer hours. More recently, the service sector union has agreed to 
negotiate jointly with the more established metal working union within ITco. 
However, this has not been accepted by ITco management. 
 
In Spain, while applying the terms of sectoral negotiation is compulsory, HR 
managers explained that they did not want to engage in any national or sectoral 
collective bargaining institutions and processes. They consider the collective 
agreements of compulsory application in their different legal entities as mere 
legislation to be fulfilled: 
 
This is unavoidable. Our approach is not to deal within the different collective bargaining 
processes. Your margin to manoeuvre there is very limited, at the end all companies share the 
same basic rules of the game. So why spend your time and resources there? Our strategy is to 
avoid the limits of the collective agreements by the introduction of our own practices and 
policies...Pay in the top quartile of the market, that is always more than the dictates of the 
collective agreement, is one of the best strategies (HR Director, Spain) 
 
The approach of disengagement from sectoral bargaining is not universal, however, 
and decisions on how to tackle national bargaining systems seem to be devolved to 
the national level. For example, the French HR Director has a significant role in the 
negotiation of the sectoral agreement in metalworking. The contrast here with the 
German approach can probably be explained on two fronts: firstly, the impact of the 
sectoral agreement on firm-level practice is less marked in France than in Germany; 
second, unions in France are not primarily organised on a sectoral basis, firms of any 
size are inevitably covered by one or other sectoral agreement, and attempts to change 
which sector a company falls under provoke significant union resistance. 
 
In addition to collective bargaining systems, German and Spanish managers also have 
to operate, at least in principle, with systems of workplace representation. Here, the 
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approach taken varies with the strength of the institutions. ITco complies with the 
German co-determination system, and it is generally seen in a relatively positive light 
by German managers: 
 
One advantage of co-determination is certainly that issues are being discussed intensively and 
you give it quite some thought before putting it into practice. Sometimes it takes more time 
before you implement it, but if you put it into practice it works better. (German HR manager) 
 
However, a senior works councilor suggested that centralisation and more short-term 
change within the corporation makes life more difficult for employee representatives: 
 
It has changed insofar that we bargained directly with the German management more often in 
the past, whereas today is (something missing here) has to be synchronised at least with 
(European HQ) or even with (corporate HQ) to bring harmonisation effects ... into accordance 
with these national requirements. The (working conditions) have become more difficult in the 
way that in the past we had sufficient time for discussion. This has been shortened drastically 
because in many countries managerial decisions can be executed directly and do not have to 
be negotiated with the works council. 
 
In ITco Spain, however, where works councils are significantly weaker, the 
managerial approach is much less compliant. Where management and works councils 
fail to agree, managers sometimes decide to implement a change in any case, and wait 
to see whether the works council challenges the move in a labour court. In practice, 
this rarely happens, underlining the malleability of institutional forms of employee 
representation in ITco in Spain. 
 
There is some evidence that national  differences in negotiation and representation 
have had some substantive impact. For example, in Germany, a workforce reduction 
of 40 percent in the early 1990s was achieved without compulsory redundancies 
[Phil…Ireland had a similar experience though smaller in scale where a particular 
product line was phased out and the people re-deployed to other Itco operations in 
Ireland..I can get you a quote if you need one]. As with other companies in Germany, 
voluntary early retirement and redeployment was the preferred method, supported by 
the works council. As budgets were more important at ITco than headcount, an unpaid 
increase in weekly working hours as a result of the new company collective 
bargaining agreement was used by German managers to argue that half of the labour 
cost reduction requested had already been achieved. 
 
Furthermore, Spanish, UK and Irish managers all indicated that the firm’s previous 
policy of employment security is no longer in place (Phil, I don’t think this is strictly 
true….rather what came across from our interviews was the perception that Itco’s 
commitment to job security had lessened over the years) . The following quotation is 
typical. 
 
Since (the 1990s) it is not correct to talk of the old, traditional ITco culture. This corporate 
culture doesn’t exist anymore. Jobs for life here? If the bottom-line goes really well, yes, jobs 
for life for the correct performers...if not everybody knows what happened in the past (HR 
Partner, Spain) – not really clear 
  
Yet, according to the HR manager and the works councilor interviewed, ITco 
Germany still follows an employment security policy. The main change with the past 
is that a specific job position is no longer guaranteed. Various training programmes 
and initiatives have been deployed to increase the long-run flexibility of employees, 
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alongside a clause in the company collective agreement which grants employees a 
right to training. As a result of redeployment combined with natural wastage, ITco did 
not have to dismiss employees in the latest round of cost savings. 
 
Meanwhile, there is virtually no evidence of any form of collective employee 
representation or union presence in Ireland. The same statement was also true in the 
UK until recently, but the need to enter the outsourcing market has to some extent 
weakened the non-union ethos. This is partly because the operations ITco is taking 
over often have high union membership (interestingly, in Spain, where the same 
pattern emerged, this was one stated reason for splitting the legal identity of the 
various divisions). While this has not transformed the general picture of a 
predominantly non-union operation in the UK it has to some extent eroded it. As one 
respondent put it: 
 
What has happened of course is ITco UK is intent on staying non-union and what has 
happened of course since they’ve brought people in from other companies and they’ve 
brought in trade unions, and they’ve been willing to do that. Now that would not have 
happened, certainly it could never have happened easily ... (in the past). The company 
believed ... that people couldn’t get a better deal with trade unions .... It didn’t really want to 
encourage an independent force. Then suddenly this gets pushes to one side by market 
conditions, because it would be quite difficult to service a number of companies unless you 
took in their labour force, and their labour force was already trade unionised anyway (retired 
HR Director, UK) 
 
The above quotation, indicating that ITco UK would previously have turned down 
business rather than work with unions, illustrates how strongly attached the UK 
subsidiary was to the corporate ideology. However, the current challenge to the 
foundations of the anti-union philosophy in the UK is more serious than a move 
towards market-led pragmatism in decisions about service provision. The outsourcing 
business, unlike ITco’s previous core businesses, is highly competitive, and ITco does 
not have market dominance. Cost-cutting pressures are strong (in particular, the 
cutting of shift allowances has raised strong collective grievances), and the nature of 
work and skills is to a far greater extent industry-specific than firm-specific. The logic 
of the internal labour market, on which ITco’s welfare capitalist model has been 
based, is much weakened, as has the capacity to offer above-market wages and offer 
substantial job security. This has the effects both of weakening the firm’s 
preoccupation with union avoidance, and of weakening employees’ commitment to 
the company, and strengthening their perceived need for union protection. 
Significantly, contracting in of employees onto ITco contracts inevitably impedes the 
operation of some HR practices, such as highly selective recruitment policies, and 
complicates the operation of the performance appraisal system. 
 
In addition, the whole issue of transferred contracts is a significant source of 
grievance both for existing ITco employees, who perceive less competent employees 
being given many of the benefits of long-standing employees, and to many of the 
transferred employees, who perceive themselves as suffering from a lack of career 
opportunities in the wider organisation and an effective cap on wage increases.  
 
However, at the same time as the company and employee bulwarks against unions are 
weakening in the outsourcing operations, another factor is weakening the structural 
basis of viable unionism there, namely the international mobility of outsourcing work. 
This is a relatively new phenomenon for ITco’s service sector employees, and while 
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ITco is likely to require significant numbers of employees in each country for the 
foreseeable future, the threat of relocating work operates as a constraint on collective 
organisation and an implicit threat for employees wishing to unionise. 
 
Pay and performance management 
 
Whereas the corporate approach to industrial relations is better described as a 
philosophy than a policy, with adaptations to national necessities, the global approach 
to pay and performance management is an area with very tight central control. The 
over-riding aim of uniformity is evidenced by the fact that the corporation’s policies 
in this area have been legally challenged in more than one European country. 
 
The global policy in this area can be divided into several components. Firstly, in the 
area of job grading, ITco changed its system radically in the 1990s. Until then the 
corporation relied on a very detailed ‘job post’ based system, historically typical of 
larger US firms (Marsden 1999), that was administered by compensation managers. 
This included over 5,000 positions that were allocated to 24 salary grades. At that 
time a new system was introduced that relied on just three factors (skills, job scope 
and leadership) and 10 broad bands. Responsibility for assigning employees to bands 
was devolved to line managers, with national targets for the percentage of employees 
in each band. The UK respondents in particular emphasized the links between these 
broad bands and globally established “career paths” governing the internal labour 
market. The grading system operates more or less uniformly across our four countries, 
although there is some works council involvement in the allocation of individuals to 
bands in the German subsidiary.  
 
The company’s system of performance appraisal is uniform globally for all 
employees, and based on performance against agreed objectives under a number of 
broad foci, namely how the individual contributes to ITco’s overall strategies, how the 
individual performs relative to defined goals, and how the team or group engages to 
achieve the goals or strategy. Managers across Europe agree that this system, which 
replaced a much more detailed performance matrix, was a European initiative, 
although opinions differ as to whether it originated in the UK or Germany. In any 
case, it is clear that the performance review process is seen as critically important in 
ITco, reflecting a strong performance-driven culture linked to performance metrics at 
individual, department/team and plant/unit level. 
 
In terms of the determination of pay, the system is based on a forced distribution with 
defined percentages of the payroll increase for each category of performers. Managers 
are “actively required” to place only 10 to 15 per cent of their subordinates in the 
highest category ‘A’, 60 to 70 per cent in ‘B’, 10 to 28 per cent in ‘C’ and 2 to 5 per 
cent in ‘D’. The highest performers receive 1.5 to 2 times the average salary increase, 
B employees the average, those in category C 0.6 times the average and those in ‘D’ 
must not receive any increase. The same appraisal process also partly determines the 
distribution of the average bonus. This can reach 10 per cent of annual salaries, is 
determined by profitability and turnover growth, and is shared according to the 
performance category in which an individual is placed. 
 
This form of linking pay to performance was evident in all the countries. The 
company’s principle that the lowest performers should not receive a salary increase is 
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translated into practice relatively easily in some countries such as the UK and Ireland, 
in that there are no significant regulatory barriers to its operation. There was, 
however, some evidence that the practice of the forced distribution was not followed 
uniformly in the UK, with some line managers and units apparently disagreeing with 
the principle of ‘forcing’ and not applying the system. 
 
In the German operations, operating a forced distribution with affects on pay requires 
considerable finessing of the industrial relations system. Indeed, for ITco Germany, 
the establishment of the pay and performance system, was a significant reason for 
leaving the system of sectoral bargaining: The metalworking agreement in practice 
determines about 90 per cent of merit increases, so that only 10 per cent is left for 
individual incentives. Another barrier to the company’s pay and performance 
management system in Germany is that base pay is the subject of collective 
bargaining, which produces an across the board increase. However, following 
agreement on this with the union, the company agreed a ‘wage matrix’ with the works 
council which links pay to performance. For those employees exhibiting poor 
performance, the collectively agreed wage increase is consolidated into basic pay; 
however, as the total level of pay is generally above the minimum agreed in firm-level 
bargaining, the company is able to reduce additional forms of remuneration to ensure 
that poor performers do not gain.  
 
Given the publicity surrounding the General Electric model of ‘culling’ the lowest 
performers in a forced distribution (ref) and the potential difficulties in applying such 
a system in some European employment systems, we explored whether there were 
consequences for the poorest performers beyond the issue of pay. This is potentially a 
problem in a European context because by definition a forced distribution does not 
necessarily identify employees who are failing to conform to the requirements of their 
job, but merely compares performance against other employees. In other words, 
forced distribution, when used to make decisions on employment security, is 
dependent on the principle of employment at will, which is not present in European 
employment systems. 
 
A number of respondents tended to stress the efforts taken to ensure that poor 
performance was rectified. For instance, a senior German works councilor stated: 
 
...there is a very small amount of employees every year who do not participate in the 
development of salaries. In these cases there are, and this is agreed upon, measures in order to 
lead those (under-performing employees) back to performance. And if they perform, they will 
participate in the next increase in salary. These are measures such as further training, 
coaching, transfer etc. And within this system you can make up a missed salary increase in a 
very short time 
 
In the German case, there is a collective bargaining side-agreement which foresees 
training for employees who did not receive an increase. Equally, in the Irish 
operations where there is no collective employee influence, managers stressed efforts 
to rectify poor performance: 
 
I suppose if you took it that there’s a likelihood that this 10 per cent population in the low, 
very low bracket, we would have an expectation of ourselves that we would turn 7 per cent of 
them around and have them performing at least the middle of the road by the end of any given 
year. (Business Partner, Ireland). 
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However, the implications for those with repeated poor performance were clear: 
 
The ones that don’t move would be managed out. Now that would be a very small amount of 
people across the board (Business Partner, Ireland). 
 
I think if you got a four, the next thing would be your P45 (termination of employment form). 
I suppose in that situation, your manager would definitely be telling you before the event if 
you were going to be a four (Employee, Ireland). 
 
In ITco Spain the consequences of being in the lowest part of the forced distribution 
are similar to those in Germany, with the significant difference that the Spanish 
subsidiary does not deal with unions in relation to this matter. If after extensive 
training the lowest performers are not able to change their marks over a maximum of 
two years, they are “invited” to leave the company, but receive a compensation which 
is usually over the legal minimum in order to avoid union conflict. The UK situation 
is similar to the Irish case. However, one important contingent factor is that while 
core employment in ITco Ireland has grown significantly recently, the ITco UK has 
been prone to restructuring and downsizing. It was acknowledged by managers that 
performance ratings were used to identify candidates for redundancy during these 
periods.  
 
The latter policy is of uncertain legal validity in many European states, and has been 
challenged in the French labour court. A policy of quotas for employees deemed 
incompetent which is aimed at making job cuts and which circumvents the statutory 
procedures involved in economic redundancies, constitutes a misuse of an assessment 
procedure under French law. While the use of forced distributions to determine wage 
increases is common in France, its use to determine job competence is not legally 
valid as the system does not use an objective definition of what constitutes acceptable 
performance. This led to the policy being adapted to the French system. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The findings in the paper support the notion of a dynamic, multi-level version of 
institutionalist analysis as a way of understanding the management of labour across 
borders within MNCs: it is dynamic in that business systems evolve over time, 
altering the rationalities of actors embedded in these systems; and it is multi-level in 
that we emphasise the importance of the interaction between extra-firm institutions 
and intra-firm processes at a number of different levels. Thus we have shown that this 
is more than simply a story of a firm responding to a turbulent market environment; 
institutional pressures and intra-firm political processes are key elements in the way 
that MNCs operate. This interaction can be understood within the framework of ‘four 
key influences’ described above.  
 
The first three of these worked together to lead the firm towards an internationally 
standardised approach to managing labour across borders, strongly influenced by 
American norms. Corporate strategy was clearly based on an attempt to build 
internationally integrated businesses with the capability to serve international 
customers, something that had knock-on effects in downstream functions like HR. A 
more specific driver of standardised HR policies was a desire to develop a cadre of 
internationally mobile staff. The nature of these internationally integrated policies is 
significantly influenced by the country of origin effect, something that shows up in a 
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number of ways. The strong influence from the corporate centre is itself a trait of 
American MNCs, as is the tendency to make radical shifts in business strategy (Ferner 
et al., 2004; Hall and Soskice, 2001). The ‘welfare capitalist’ tradition is further 
evidence of American traits showing through at the international level, while the way 
in which this has been eroded by the pressures of globalisation and the push for 
‘shareholder value’ is part of a wider pattern in the US business system (O’Sullivan, 
2000). Perhaps the most striking evidence of a country-of-origin effect was the deep-
rooted ideological antipathy to collectivism. While they are more difficult to measure, 
it is also plausible to argue that ‘dominance effects’ have played their part in shaping 
the company’s approach. The reassertion of control from the HQ in the 1990s 
coincided with the renewal of the American ‘dominance’ or ‘hegemony’ after two 
decades in which the German and Japanese economies had appeared to be performing 
more strongly. More specifically, the IT sector became increasingly dominated by 
American firms in this period, thereby providing a supportive context for corporate 
policies that are modelled on home country operations. 
 
The findings also demonstrate the way that these influences vary over time: generally 
speaking, the pressures towards building internationally integrated operations have 
grown in recent years; the strength of the country of origin effect has fluctuated 
markedly in ITco over the last three decades or so; and the nature of dominance 
effects also shifts with variations in comparative economic performance and also with 
prevailing economic orthodoxies. Thus the analysis supports a dynamic conception of 
how MNCs are influenced by economic conditions and institutional configurations. 
 
Our analysis has also demonstrated that there are significant barriers to the combined 
push for uniform policies based mainly on home country lines. Host country effects 
have taken the form of the need to engage in systems of collective bargaining and 
accept workplace representation in Germany, France and Spain, and to be more 
tolerant towards representation in the UK. However, a central theme of the findings 
from all the countries has been the ‘malleability’ of host country systems. The 
tendency for managers in Spain to overrule the views of the workplace representatives 
and risk a legal challenge which rarely materialises is one illustration of this, while 
the opting out of the metalworking collective agreement in Germany so that the firm 
can deal with a more moderate union is another.  
 
Evidently, institutional influences leave a degree of ‘social space’ that organisational 
actors can exploit. Institutional forces shape, but do not determine, the way that 
MNCs function. Since different groups of actors will look to advance different 
agendas and interests, the logical outcome is that organisational politics are a key 
feature of the way that international HR policies are formed and operationalised. As 
we have seen, organisational politics and institutional forces interact at a number of 
different levels: the nature of international institutions and the distinctiveness of the 
domestic business system are central influences over the orientation of senior 
managers; specialised knowledge of the key institutions that govern economic activity 
in a particular country represents one source of power that one group of managers can 
use to their advantage in dealing with groups in other countries; and within 
workplaces and business units, actors have some room for manoeuvre to operate 
corporate policies in ways that were not intended by the creators of the policies. 
Therefore, institutional pressures should be seen as operating at a number of different 
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levels within MNCs, providing support for our notion of the need for a multi-level 
analysis. 
 
Overall, we have developed an analytical framework that has national level 
institutions at its core, but one that is also sensitive to the way in which institutions 
evolve over time and to the way that they interact with the agency of organisational 
actors at a range of levels. This provides a richer understanding of how firms such as 
ITco manage their international workforces than accounts which adopt a 
predominantly static view of culture or those that rely solely on the market 
environment. 
 
The case study data utilised in this paper are not without their limitations, of course, 
meaning that some important questions could not be addressed, three of which we 
discuss here. First, the case study covers four principal and one supplementary 
countries and, while these encompass quite different institutional frameworks, they 
are all developed market economies. This raises the question of what the situation is 
in the firm’s operations in developing countries. It is possible that the scale of the 
cultural or institutional ‘distance’ between the US and, say, African countries means 
that there is less attempt to transfer practices to sites in these locations. Alternatively, 
the lack of any concerted attempt to push standardised practices to these locations 
may reflect the role that these sites play as low-cost production sites, with 
management seeing little incentive to transfer those practices deployed for workers in 
developing countries. A third possibility is that transfer does occur but that the 
adjustments and clashes with host business systems will be greater. 
 
Second, by only looking at subsidiaries in Europe the data do not position us to 
address the question of how the roles of various regional levels of management differ. 
We have demonstrated that the European level has become an increasingly important 
axis within the firm, but is the same true of Asia Pacific for example? Might we 
expect the regional management structure in the Asia Pacific region to be more or less 
influential than its European counterpart? One possibility is that the peculiarities of 
the business systems in the region, and their differences from the American business 
system, make regional managers crucial intermediaries between the parent firm and 
the national markets in the region. Another possibility, however, is that the low-cost, 
and hence low status, nature of the operations in the region makes them dispensable, 
thereby putting management in a weak position. 
 
Third, by adopting a single case study method we cannot address the potential role of 
corporate characteristics in mediating the influence of institutional pressures leading 
to variations between MNCs in how these effects are played out at firm and site level. 
It is inevitable that studies in MNCs in other sectors, of different vintage and size, 
pursuing different strategies, adopting different modes of entry and from different 
countries of origin would produce findings at variance with those presented here. Full 
discussions of this issue and the other two discussed above have to be left to future 
research. 
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Appendix: Interviews 
 
 
The vast majority of the interviews were carried out by two or more members of the 
research team and some were conducted by members of different national teams. 
Indeed, the national research teams regularly exchanged information during the study. 
Interviews were carried out with a range of respondents: many of these were in the 
HR function; some were in other managerial functions, such as the head of a business 
unit; and some were non-managerial employees. The interviews were semi-structured, 
were carried out with company permission on site, were conducted in the 
respondents’ native language and were fully transcribed and analysed using QSR N5 
software. 
 
 
The Interviews 
 
Country HR Other Mgt Employees Total 
UK 4 1 12 17 
Ireland    17 
Spain    6 
Germany 2 0 3* 5 
France 1   1 
Euro HQ 7 - - 7 
Corporate HQ 4 - - 4 
Total    57 
 
*employee representatives 
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